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As Freeman (pg. 80, 1994) says: ￿Everyone, or nearly everyone, wants some labour stan-
dards￿ . For example, no one (these days) defends or advocates slavery. For other labour
standards, such unanimity is lacking. Think for instance of such issues as convict labour,
child labour, minimum wages, trade union freedom, or occupational safety and health. One
may begin an economic analysis of labour standards by inquiring into what consumers would
pay extra for regarding products made under ￿decent￿working conditions. Consider two
pairs of tennis shoes identical in every respect but the labour practices under which they
were manufactured. Starting from the same level and raising the price of the shoes made
under better conditions by 50 cents, 1 euro, 2 euros, etc., answer the question: which pair
would you buy? The additional amount consumers are disposed to pay would give us the
demand curve for labour standards.
This paper proposes a partial equilibrium model where consumers have a demand
for standards and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), activist organizations, inter-
est groups, unions and media reveal information about labour standards to consumers. The
purpose is to study the e⁄ect of an increase in the fraction of informed inequity-averse con-
sumers (from now on activism) on the behaviour of multinational ￿rms, on the equilibrium
level of labour standards and on the welfare of the less developed countries (LDCs).
Key in this model is the idea of fairness, capturing the desire to reduce the degree of
inequality induced by di⁄erent labour practices. The point is that if demand for labour stan-
dards is grounded in consumer preferences, then a positive analysis of standards must begin
with these preferences. To support this type of preferences we ask for evidence that people
will pay at least a modest premium for the shoes made under better working conditions.
An initial contribution comes from consumer surveys showing that Americans are willing
to pay more for products manufactured under decent labour conditions and try to avoid
products tarred by inadequate standards (Marymount University 1999, the University of
Maryland 2000, Freeman 1998 and Haq 1996). A second contribution comes from empirical
studies. Rock (2001) uses the event study technique to assess the impact of public disclosure
of ￿rms￿sweatshop practices on their stock prices. He ￿nds that public disclosure does
indeed cause ￿rms stock prices to fall.1 Other results document that fairness concerns
1The thesis is that anti-sweatshop activists publicize information on large ￿rms producing well-known
brands prompting consumers to act on their latent demand by refraining from buying these ￿rms￿prod-
ucts, and thus reducing sales and pro￿ts. So if stock markets convey information rapidly, public disclosure
campaigns should contribute to declines in ￿rms publicly traded stock prices.
￿1 ￿a⁄ect labour relations. Kahneman et al. (1986) use household surveys of public opinions to
infer rules of fairness for conduct in the market. Blinder and Choi (1990), and Agell and
Lundborg (1995) use interview surveys showing that notions of fairness are important, and
that they may explain nominal wage rigidity.2
This puzzling evidence that in some situations the pure self-interested model is refuted,
while in others it seems to be accurate (market games, public good games without pun-
ishment) has been reconciled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), who assume that in addition to
self-interested people there is a fraction of fairness-motivated people. To model our con-
sumers￿demand for standards we use a simple version of their formalization of the notion
of fairness as inequity aversion.
If consumers have a demand for labour standards, why doesn￿ t the market produce the
socially optimal level of standards? A main market failure is consumers￿lack of information
about workplace conditions. Public or private organizations could help ￿ll this gap.
An important role in informing consumers and determining preferences for labour stan-
dards is played by non-governmental organizations, interest groups, unions and media. In
our descriptive approach we concentrate on the role played by NGOs and other organizations
in disclosing information about labour standards to consumers.3
Besides inequity-averse consumers and activism, a third basic ingredient of our analysis
is the multi-national enterprise (MNE). Direct foreign investment (FDI) has grown rapidly
throughout the world. Even though advanced industrialized countries have remained the
main destination of FDI ￿ ows going to developing countries grew steadily, from 22 per cent
in 1985 to 38 per cent in 1997 (pg. 18 ILO 2002). Multinationals take several factors into
account when deciding where and how much to produce. One of these factors are labour
standards. An interesting issue is investigating the motives of multinational ￿rms in choosing
production locations and examining the role of activism in in￿ uencing consumer demand
and, consequently, the behaviour of the ￿rms themselves.4 If consumers have a demand
2Further support comes from the experimental literature. Relevant experimental studies concern the
ultimatum game and the dictator game. The former focuses on how two individuals bargain over the
division of a given pie. Player one o⁄ers a share to player two. If player two accepts, each gets the shares
player one decided. In case of rejection, both players get zero. The standard model predicts that player one
o⁄ers zero to player two, who accepts. But numerous studies (Camerer and Thaler 1995, Roth 1995) refute
this prediction, suggesting that fairness a⁄ects the behaviour of many people. Even more impressive are the
results for the dictator game. In this game only player one decides, whatever split he choose goes. Once
again the standard model predicts that player one o⁄ers zero to player two. In contrast, in the experimental
studies (Forsythe et al. 1994, Andreoni and Miller 1995) only a minority actually gives zero.
3Rock (2001) recalls that the anti-sweatshop movement arose in America in the 1990s and by the end of
the decade 43 American NGOs and a growing number of international organizations were engaged.
4Haaland and Wooton (1999) study the role of investment incentives o⁄ered by countries in in￿ uencing
the location decision by an MNE. But their ￿rm faces the same demand curve while we start from consumers￿
￿2 ￿for standards, the main e⁄ect of activism is to make the price of the good dependent on
the standards used to do it. Clearly, production and location decisions will depend on the
di⁄erence in standards between the developed country and the LDC.
We then investigate how governments choose standards and the e⁄ect of an increase
in the fraction of informed inequity-averse consumers on the standards equilibrium level
and on the welfare of the workers in the LDC. Governments face a fundamental trade o⁄
between lowering standards in order to attract the MNE and improving working conditions
in order to increase per worker utility. An increase in the public disclosure of information
on standards deteriorates working conditions in both the developed and the less developed
country, starting a race to the bottom. Choosing non-cooperatively governments do not
internalise the negative externality on the other country￿ s employment and in the end both
countries are left worse o⁄.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. In Section 3 wages are
determined. Section 4 presents the MNE production and location decisions. In Section 5
we investigate the comparative statics of activism. Section 6 argues that results are robust
for variations in the set-up. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider two countries D(eveloped) and L(ess developed) and an MNE that produces a
product made of one input: labour. The input can be o⁄ered by workers in both countries.
Governments, which are benevolent decision makers, decide si with i 2 fD;Lg; the labour
standards which are chosen to maximize the bene￿t of MNE employment. Having observed
the standards chosen by governments, the company will choose the level of production and
how to divide the production process between the two countries. Wages are determined.
Finally, a continuum of consumers of unit size forms demand.
2.1 Labour Standards and Workers
Freeman (1994) divides standards between core standards that address human rights and
cost standards that a⁄ect ￿rm behaviour. Many core standards (freedom of association,
prohibition of forced labour, non-discrimination in employment) can be met without high
levels of income and should be universal. On the contrary, cost standards (minimum wages,
health, safety and child labour standards) are GNP sensitive and, therefore, should not be
applied universally. But, as underlined by Freeman (pg. 89, 1994), this distinction still
leaves open some di¢ cult cases: "While no one can object to di⁄erent wage standards or
preferences to ￿nd a demand schedule that depends on labour standards.
￿3 ￿minimum wages across countries, varying health and safety or child labour standards is
more problematic". Consumers dislike the inhumane and unsafe labour practices under
which some products are manufactured and not wage di⁄erences between developed and
developing countries. In this paper, we focus on those standards which are important to
consumers and costly for ￿rms.
It should also be noticed that, though one-dimensional, our standard measure s can be
thought of as a summary measure of many di⁄erent dimensions of standards. This implies
that a government can raise s either by raising the value of one of its particular components,
such as the occupational safety and health level, or by adding a new, previously neglected
component, say limiting child labour.
The reason why consumers care for the labour practices under which products are man-
ufactured is that labour standards a⁄ect worker￿ s utility. Assume that workers get utility
from wage and labour standards and disutility from e⁄ort:
ui = wi ￿ e + bsi; (1)
with i 2 fD;Lg where e is the level of e⁄ort, wi is wage in country D(eveloped) and
L(ess developed) and b is the bene￿t of standard si:5
2.2 Consumers
As in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) an individual is inequity-averse if he dislikes outcomes that





sel￿sh subjects, who care only about the well-being they get from the consumption of
the product, there are also consumers (the remaining fraction ￿
0
) who dislike a di⁄erence
between labour standards. Thanks to the work of activist organizations, interest groups,
unions and media a fraction of consumers ￿
00
is informed about the labour standards chosen




are not informed.6 All groups of consumers have the
same taste parameter v: In practice, uninformed and self-interested individuals have the
same consumption behaviour. In both cases they have quasi-linear quadratic preferences
uc = vx ￿ x2
2 + m; where x is quantity and m is the numeraire. Instead, the utility of
well-informed, inequity-averse consumers is:




5For simplicity, workers are assumed distinct from consumers.
6Consumers are passive in acquiring information. The idea being that without activism they are unaware
of the existence of a practice they may dislike.
￿4 ￿The new term in (2) measures the e⁄ect on utility of inequity.
According to the experimental evidence that people have an innate desire for fairness,
we assume ￿ > 0; as otherwise we would be back to the case of sel￿sh and/or uninformed
subjects. In particular, ￿ positive means we rule out the possibility that consumers like
inequity.




the fraction of well-informed inequity-averse consumers, with
(1 ￿ ￿) the rest. From now on we keep the proportion of sel￿sh consumers in the population
￿xed. Therefore, ￿ is in￿ uenced only by activism and is a measure of that activism.
For all consumers the budget constraint is:
m + xp 6 y
where the expression on the left-hand side is the consumer￿ s total spending (p is the price
of the product) and y is the (positive) initial endowment.
For each group of consumers demand is obtained by maximizing the utility function uc
subject to the budget constraint. Well-informed inequity-averse consumers will demand a
quantity x = v ￿p￿￿ jsD ￿ sLj;while the rest will demand x = v ￿p: The overall demand
is:
x = (1 ￿ ￿)(v ￿ p) + ￿(v ￿ p ￿ ￿ jsD ￿ sLj): (3)
De￿ne ￿s = sD ￿ sL as the di⁄erence in labour standards. Then, demand increases in
the taste parameter v and decreases in price p. An increase in ￿; the fraction of informed
inequity-averse consumers, increases the fraction of consumers that su⁄er the e⁄ect of in-
equity on utility. Thus when standards are di⁄erent demand decreases in ￿. The demand
obtains a maximum for sD = sL: The inverse demand curve as a function of the di⁄erence
in labour standards is:
p = v ￿ x ￿ ￿￿ j￿sj:
The claim that when standards are di⁄erent demand decreases in ￿ deserves some clar-
i￿cations. One could wonder why the MNE cannot separate the market by putting a label
denoting the country of production? In this case, he would sell the fraction produced
under the better conditions (sD) to the inequity-averse consumers, and the rest to the self-
interested ones. In our model this will not work. In fact, what we are really assuming is
that inequity-averse consumers, whenever informed, su⁄er from the existence of the unequal
treatment in itself. Then if the MNE produces (even part of its output) using poor labour
standards (sL) they will punish it, no matter the production conditions of the speci￿c object
they face.
￿5 ￿2.3 MNE
Our product is made by a monopolist7. The ￿rm can become a multinational by deciding
to produce in both countries. The expression for pro￿ts is:




We normalize the labour requirement for one unit of ￿nal product to one. Thus the com-
pany￿ s work-force is equal to the level of production x: Pro￿ts are a function of labour
standards, because those a⁄ect both the price that consumers are willing to pay and the
production cost. f is quantity outsourced, the part of the total production manufactured in
the LDC, as well as LDC￿ s workers employed in the MNE. The remaining quantity, x ￿ f;
is produced in the developed country (by x ￿ f workers).8 Producing or subcontracting
f in an LDC￿ s plant, costs the ￿rm
kf2
2 ; where k is a cost parameter.9 Finally, in both
the developed and the less developed country, the marginal production cost, wi + csi with
i 2 fD;Lg; is equal to per worker cost, i.e., the wage plus the cost to guarantee a certain
standard to each worker, where c is the marginal cost of standard si:
2.4 Governments
Workers employed by the multinational have an opportunity cost Vi with i 2 fD;Lg, where
V is the wage in the secondary or in the informal sector. In some sense the opportunity cost
can also be interpreted as a measure of the general employment conditions. High opportunity
cost indicates close to full employment, low V indicates that the extra employment that
the company would provide is of great value to the country. Governments choose labour
standards to maximize the bene￿t of MNE employment:
WD = (x ￿ f)(uD ￿ VD) (5)
WL = f (uL ￿ VL):
Wi the welfare contribution of the multinational is the product of the number of workers f
(x ￿ f) and the di⁄erence between each workers￿utility and the opportunity cost uL ￿ VL
(uD ￿ VD).
7In Section 6 we show that the main result does not rely on the monopoly assumption.
8Sometimes a discrete location choice could seem more appropriate. However, treating the multinational
enterprise location decision as a continuous variable makes the analysis more elegant and simpler, without
changing the qualitative results.
9Those costs are both direct ones such as transportation cost, construction of new plants, etc. and indirect
ones like any form of lobbying against outsourcing.
￿6 ￿The choice of the government￿ s objective function deserves some comments. First, gov-
ernments are not concerned with the wellbeing of ￿rms because we assume that neither
country owns the company. Think of a British MNE that must choose between producing
in Spain or in China; second, this paper￿ s approach is descriptive rather than normative in
nature (the choice of a non-cooperative game in Section 5 is driven by this). Having policy
makers maximize consumers interest would not be a good description of reality. Indeed,
due to collective action problems consumers are divided and may not be e⁄ective in lobby-
ing policy makers. On the contrary, workers interests are represented by unions that can
e⁄ectively lobby policy makers.
3 Wage determination
We include an explicitly noncompetitive labour market. We set out a two-country e¢ -
ciency wage model (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). Individual employees can decide to shirk
and exert zero e⁄ort, but an individual who shirks runs the risk of being detected. De-
note by ￿ the probability of escaping detection and assume that anyone caught shirking is
￿red. The expected utility of a worker who has been ￿red is Eui = (wi ￿ e + bsi)"(U) +
(Vi + ￿ibsi)(1 ￿ "(U)) with i 2 fD;Lg: "(U) is the probability of ￿nding another job with
the same quali￿cation, while ￿i is a parameter that measure the enforcement of labour
standards in the secondary or informal sector. We assume that workers enjoy lower bene￿t
0 < ￿i < 1 in the secondary or informal sector and that enforcement of labour standards is
greater in the developed country, ￿D > ￿L. This is because some sectors like agriculture,
logging, ￿shing and mining are often the world￿ s most hazardous industries and because
in some sectors standards are badly enforced. Writing about the prominence of occupa-
tional safety and health standards the ILO Global Employment Agenda (2002 pg.42) made
the following observation: "informal sector working, (especially in poor countries) can be
particularly hazardous partly because of its semi-illegality...".
Employers must pay a wage that is su¢ ciently high to induce employees not to shirk.
For a no-shirking equilibrium, the expected utility from not shirking must equal that from
shirking:
wi ￿ e + bsi = ￿ (wi + bsi) + (1 ￿ ￿)Eui;
which simpli￿es after manipulation, to:
wi (si;￿i) = e + Vi +
e￿
(1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ "(U)]
￿ bsi (1 ￿ ￿i): (6)
Note that higher bene￿ts from labour standards are partially outweighed by a reduction
in base earnings, as employers take away part of the bene￿ts lowering wages (
@wi(si;￿i)
@si < 0).





@￿i@si > 0). De￿ne ￿￿ = ￿D ￿ ￿L; the di⁄erent capabilities of enforcing regulation
between the developed and the less developed country.
4 MNE￿ s decisions: production and outsourcing
The ￿rm decides the optimal level of production and quantity outsourced. Maximizing (4)
with respect to x and f yields the following solution:10
x(sD;sL;￿) = (v ￿ ￿￿ j￿sj ￿ wD (sD;￿D) ￿ csD)=2
f (sD;sL) = (wD (sD;￿D) + csD ￿ wL (sL;￿L) ￿ csL)=k
(7)
An increase in ￿; the fraction of well-informed inequity-averse consumers, has an impact
on the level of production. When labour standards are di⁄erent, demand decreases in ￿;
thus the quantity produced is negatively a⁄ected by an increase in ￿. The same is true for
an increase in ￿, j￿sj and country￿ s D marginal production cost.
Country￿ s L marginal production cost has no e⁄ect on the optimal production level but it
is relevant for the optimal division of production between the two countries. In deciding the
level of quantity outsourced, the MNE equate the di⁄erence in the two countries marginal
production cost with the cost of moving part of the production to the LDC. The company
will choose a positive level of quantity outsourced only if the marginal cost in the LDC is
lower than in the D country.
To study the role played by enforcement capabilities, we use equilibrium wage in (6) to
get a country￿ s i marginal production cost:
wi (si;￿i) + csi = e +
e￿
(1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ "(U)]
+ Vi ￿ bsi (1 ￿ ￿i) + csi: (8)
Substituting (8) in (7) it is simple to see that an increase in ￿D; by increasing country
D￿ s marginal production cost has a negative e⁄ect on production. Moreover, the increase
in country D￿ s marginal production cost increases the di⁄erence in the two countries costs
and has a positive e⁄ect on quantity outsourced. On the contrary, an increase in the LDC
enforcement capabilities, ￿L; has a negative e⁄ect on quantity outsourced.
5 The Governments Game
Some argue that labour market regulation is necessary to protect the rights of workers and
to improve working conditions. Others point out that most regulations discourage ￿rms
10The second order conditions are satis￿ed given:
@2￿
@x2 = ￿2 < 0;
@2￿
@f2 = ￿k < 0 and the determinant of
the Hessian matrix jHj = 2k > 0:
￿8 ￿from hiring workers and thus have the unintended consequence of harming the very people
they are designed to protect. Moreover, as said before, the level of employment also depends
on activism. The purpose of this section is to study how governments choose standards and
the e⁄ect of activism on their equilibrium level and on the welfare of the workers in the less
developed country.
It is a controversial issue whether labour standards should be part of international agree-
ments, and getting countries to credibly delegate the decision process to a supra-national
authority appears very di¢ cult indeed. Therefore, the non-cooperative approach appears
the best description of the real world. We look for the simultaneous solution of the following
programmes. For the developed country:
max
sD
WD = (x(sD;sL;￿) ￿ f (sD;sL))(B + bsD￿D) (9)
and for the less developed country:
max
sL
WL = f (sD;sL)(B + bsL￿L): (10)
To get the previous expressions: ￿rst, substitute the equilibrium wage (6) in the workers￿
utility (1). The resulting workers￿utility is a function of labour standards and their enforce-
ment: ui (si;￿i) = B + Vi + bsi￿i; (B = e￿
(1￿￿)[1￿"(U)]).11 Then, substitute this expression
together with production and quantity outsourced (7) in the governments￿objective (5).
For each country, Wi; the welfare contribution of the multinational, is the product of
the number of workers f (x￿f) and the per worker bene￿t uL ￿VL (uD ￿VD). Therefore,
governments face a fundamental trade o⁄ between lowering standards in order to attract
the company and improving working conditions in order to increase per worker utility. We
assume that12
c ￿ b(1 ￿ ￿L) > b￿￿: (11)
Condition (11) has a nice economic interpretation. In words, the increase in countries￿
marginal production cost due to a small increase in labour standards is big enough.13 Par-
ticularly, it is greater than a measure of the di⁄erent capabilities of enforcing regulation
between the developed and the less developed country. This assumption can be seen as a
formalization of Freeman￿ s distinction between core and cost standards. For some standards,





@￿i > 0 and
@2ui(si;￿i)
@si@￿i > 0).
12Recalling that that enforcement of labour standards is greater in the developed country, ￿D > ￿L;
condition (11) also implies c ￿ b(1 ￿ ￿D) > c ￿ b(1 ￿ ￿L) > 0:
13The left-hand side of (11) is equal to @(wL + csL)=@sL:
￿9 ￿the marginal bene￿t of standards, b; is high while the marginal cost, c; is low. This is the core
standard region (freedom of association, prohibition of forced labour, non-discrimination in
employment) that can be met without regard to the degree of development. For other stan-
dards, the marginal cost c is high. Standards in this cost region (health, safety and child
labour standards), which are important to consumers and costly for ￿rms are the focus of




@ (x(sD;sL;￿) ￿ f (sD;sL))
@sD
(B + bsD￿D) + (x(sD;sL;￿) ￿ f (sD;sL))b￿D = 0:
(12)





@sD : The ￿rst and second-order












@sL : Note that assumption (11) implies that the solution is interior
and that the second-order conditions are satis￿ed.
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L(sD); which denote the slopes of the countries reaction curves are
both positives. Therefore, si is an increasing function of sj; i 6= j: In other words, labour
standards are strategic complements.




L(sD) are both smaller than one so that there exist a
unique stable Nash equilibrium.14
5.1 Does activism improve labour practices?
We are now ready to study the e⁄ect of an increase in ￿; the fraction of well-informed
inequity-averse consumers, on the equilibrium level of labour standards for the interesting
and plausible case of ￿s > 0:
Proposition 1 An increase in activism reduces labour standards in both countries and it
has an ambiguous e⁄ect on their distance, ￿s.
14This is easily seen using condition (11) and recalling that c ￿ b(1 ￿ ￿D) > c ￿ b(1 ￿ ￿L) > 0:
￿10 ￿Proof: Assume that ￿s > 0 and that the system consisting of equations (12) and (13)
satis￿es the condition required by the implicit function theorem: both implicit functions
have continuous derivatives and the endogenous variables Jacobian jJj is nonzero when
evaluated at the equilibrium. Actually, (11) is su¢ cient to have jJj strictly positive15. Use




￿=k((B + bsD￿D) + b￿D￿s)(b￿L (c ￿ b(1 ￿ ￿L)))
jJj
(14)




￿=2k((B + bsD￿D) + b￿D￿s)(b￿L (c ￿ b(1 ￿ ￿D)))
jJj
(15)








= sign(b￿￿ ￿ c + b(1 ￿ ￿L)) is not restricted by assumption (11). Thus,
we conclude that ￿s can both increase or decrease.
Public disclosure of information on standards deteriorates working conditions in both
the developed and the less developed country. The governments in the two countries set
standards non-cooperatively facing the same trade o⁄. An increase in labor standards by
a government improves the workers conditions at the cost of reducing employment, as the
multinational increases its￿relocation into the other country. Consider country D. A lower
total demand, induced by a greater fraction of well-informed inequity-averse consumers,
decreases the marginal bene￿t of higher labour standards and increases their marginal cost;
thus, the labour standards in country D decrease. Given that the reaction curves of the two
governments are such that sD and sL are strategic complements, the standards in the LDC
also decrease. Pressure for international harmonization of labour standards, in the absence
of coordination, creates a prisoner￿ s dilemma. More public disclosure of information to
consumers, lowering demand, starts a race to the bottom. Countries will each lower their
own standards in order to gain a competitive advantage.
5.2 Is activism good for LDCs?
To assess the desirability of public disclosure of information, the point is not if workers
deserve a better treatment. The questions to answer are: if workers and their country are
worse o⁄producing goods based on low standards than they would be in other circumstances.
We answered the former question, showing that activism deteriorates standards, and then















L(sD) < 1 which is true
given that the slopes of both reaction curves are smaller than 1:
￿11 ￿per worker utility. Studying the e⁄ect of activism on the welfare of each country, boils down
to investigate whether the decrease in per worker utility is compensated by an increase in
the work force or not.
The ￿rst thing to note is that a larger fraction of consumers aware of the di⁄erence in
standards, an increase in ￿; depresses demand and employment decreasing total welfare.









(B + bsD￿D) < 0:
Once strategic interactions between governments are taken into account activism could
change the ￿ division of the pie￿ , making the LDC country better o⁄. This is not the case as
shown in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 Activism will decrease welfare in both countries.
Proof: Assume ￿s > 0: Applying the envelope theorem to the maximized value of









































The strategic e⁄ect, common to (16) and (17), is negative: standards are conventional
complements (@WL=@sD > 0; @WD=@sL > 0) and dsD
d￿ or dsL
d￿ sign the e⁄ect (see Proposition
1). Moreover, the consumer consciousness e⁄ect in (17), is negative too.
Activism reduces welfare in both countries. This is due to two e⁄ects. When a greater
fraction of consumers are informed about labour standards inequality, the subsequent de-
crease in demand is clearly welfare decreasing. This consumer consciousness e⁄ect is present
both in cooperative and in non-cooperative settings. But this is not the whole story. Choos-
ing non-cooperatively governments do not internalise the negative externality on the other
country￿ s employment. In fact, the decrease in demand pushes the developed country to
lower standards, but lower standards in D have also the e⁄ect of pushing the ￿rm to lower
quantity outsourced, so that the less developed country reacts lowering standards as well.
This strategic or prisoner dilemma e⁄ect shown in Proposition 1 sums to the consumer
consciousness e⁄ect and at the end both countries are worse o⁄.
￿12 ￿6 Discussion and Extensions
In this Section we argue that our results are robust to di⁄erent variations in the set-up and
we give a better understanding of the key elements of the model. In particular, we study
three extensions related to the e⁄ect of labeling, to the relevance of the market structure and
to the consumer consciousness e⁄ect. The Conclusion discusses other potential extensions
which are left for further research.
6.1 The e⁄ect of labeling
We have already noted that our monopolist cannot separate the market by putting a la-
bel denoting the country of production, because inequity-averse consumers su⁄er from the
existence of the unequal treatment in itself, no matter the production conditions of the spe-
ci￿c object they buy. More in general, an alternative mechanism to legal regulation for the
elimination of poor labour standards would be to label products and leave producers free to
choose labour conditions in their workplaces. A recent interesting paper by Davies (2005)
shows that under Bertrand competition, such completely market-based method is unlikely
to eliminate child labour. Another paper by Baland and Duprez (2004) analyses the impact
of both social and geographical labelling on child labour. A model of North-South trade is
developed, which shows that social labelling will not have any e⁄ects in several cases. Those
results, together with our work, imply that for the elimination of poor labour standards,
demand-driven mechanisms, fully or partially market-based may not be su¢ cient.
6.2 Oligopoly
Do the negative results rely on the monopoly assumption for the product market? To answer
this question we assume that the good is produced by n ￿rms competing ￿ la Cournot. Then






xj ￿ ￿￿ j￿sj
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Solving problem (18) for the symmetric case, yields the following solution16:
xj = x = (v ￿ ￿￿ j￿sj ￿ wD (sD;￿D) ￿ csD)=(n + 1) for any j = 1:::n
fj = f = (wD (sD;￿D) + csD ￿ wL (sL;￿L) ￿ csL)=k for any j = 1:::n:
16Note that while f is constant with respect to n, x is decreasing in n: There is then an n such that
x(n) = f; i.e. from n on all the production is carried out in the LDC.
￿13 ￿Next, we follow the same steps as in Section 5. We ￿rst solve for the simultaneous
solution of the governments programmes. Then, making use of the implicit function theorem











k(n+1) ((B + bsD￿D) + b￿D￿s)(b￿L (c ￿ b(1 ￿ ￿D)))
jJj
;
which are a generalisation of (14) and (15) and are both negative. It is also straightforward
to check that activism reduces welfare in both countries. Therefore, we argue that the
monopoly assumption is not a key element of the model.
6.3 Consumer consciousness
Information about labor standards does not increase the utility of an inequity-averse con-
sumer and such consumer would always prefer to remain uninformed. In other words, the
information provided by activists has only a negative connotation, as it results clear from
the utility function in (2). In some circumstances, it may be realistic to assume that there
is also a bene￿t from this information. Consumers utility could depend positively on the
consciousness of facing the problem or it may increase in the fraction of the total production
made under good labor conditions, and so on. To represent such preferences while preserving
the tractability of the model, let us assume that the utility of well-informed, inequity-averse
consumers is:




where I is a parameter that measures the bene￿t from being informed.



















De￿ne b I = ￿ (￿s + sD + B=b￿D): We are now able to sign the e⁄ect of activism on the
equilibrium level of labour standards and on the welfare of the LDC￿ s workers for di⁄erent
ranges of parameter I:17
Parameter regions (i) I 6 ￿￿s (ii) ￿￿s < I < b I (iii) I > b I
E⁄ect of ￿ on standars signdsD
d￿ anddsL
d￿ ￿ ￿ 0=+
Consumer Consciousness
d(WD+WL)
d￿ ￿=0 + +
E⁄ect of ￿ on LDC dWL
d￿ ￿ ￿ 0=+
17Note that for I = 0 we are back to the benchmark model.
￿14 ￿Recall from Subsection 5.2 that we talk of consumer consciousness e⁄ect when prior
to any strategic interaction activism reduces demand and welfare in both countries. This
e⁄ect, which is present both in cooperative and in non-cooperative settings, is still there
when I < ￿￿s (region (i)). Therefore, to understand how key it is for our results, we now
look at regions (ii) and (iii). When the bene￿t from being informed is su¢ ciently high (iii),
the e⁄ect of activism on labour standards and on workers￿welfare in the LDC is positive.
However, the most interesting range of parameters is the one in column (ii). In fact, we ￿nd
that even if the consumer consciousness e⁄ect is not present (activism increases demand),
when a greater fraction of consumers are informed about labour practices, the equilibrium
level of labour standards and the welfare of the workers in the LDC are decreasing. It is
di¢ cult to say whether or not there is a bene￿t for inequity-averse consumers from being
informed about poor labour conditions. And it seems particularly challenging to imagine
how big this bene￿t could be. We conjecture that the negative connotation will always
dominate the positive one.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that public disclosure of information on labour standards deteriorates both
working conditions and welfare in the less developed country. We have also argued that
these negative results are robust to variations in the set-up. In particular, we have studied
labeling, di⁄erent market structures and a weakening of the consumer consciousness e⁄ect.
Another natural extension concerns the possibility of lobbying both of the governments by
the MNE, and of the MNE by consumer groups. This potential extension is left for further
research.
This paper has treated the role of activists in disclosing information to consumers in
the simplest possible way, and it has concentrated on the role played by governments in
setting standards. In two complementary papers, Baron (2001) and Feddersen and Gilligan
(2001) provide a theory in which interest and activist groups attempt to in￿ uence economic
activity directly without reliance on public institutions or o¢ ceholders. Our paper adds the
role of governments while leaving activists unmodelled. Feddersen and Gilligan￿ s activist
provides information to consumers who have a demand for a good whose quality cannot
be determined from consumption. They show that by providing information to consumers
the activist mitigates a market failure due to incomplete information about quality. The
activist can help segment the market in favour of a ￿rm that adopts the good technology.
Di⁄erently from our paper the activist thus generates a welfare improvement. Key for our
negative outcomes to obtain is the prisoner￿ s dilemma aspect of governments interaction.
Public disclosure of information to consumers, lowering demand, starts a race to the bottom.
￿15 ￿Countries will each lower their own standards in order to gain a competitive advantage.
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Abstract   
Activist organizations, interest groups, unions and media reveal information about labour standards. In a world 
where some consumers are not self-interested, the price of a product made by a multinational enterprise and the 
latter's location and production decisions depend on the difference in labour standards between developed and 
less developed countries. We study the effect of an increase in the fraction of informed inequity-averse 
consumers on the behaviour of multinational firms, on the equilibrium level of labour standards and on the welfare 
of workers in the less developed countries. An increase in activism deteriorates labour practices and decreases 
welfare. 
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